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STATE (UN)SEPARATED POWERS
AND COMMANDEERING
Aaron P. Brecher*
INTRODUCTION
One of the more controversial aspects of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act1 (PPACA) is the requirement that a health care
exchange for the comparison and purchase of approved health insurance
plans be established in each state.2 The PPACA mandates that if a state’s
government chooses not to establish an approved exchange, the federal
government will do so, with or without state cooperation.3 But in a
potentially serious blow to the PPACA’s successful implementation, the
U.S. Supreme Court will soon decide a challenge contending that
participants in federally established exchanges are not entitled to the tax
subsidies available to participants in state-established exchanges.4 One
unfamiliar with the anti-commandeering doctrine might be forgiven for
wondering: Wouldn’t it be easier for the federal government to merely
establish standards for the health care exchanges and order the states to
establish and maintain them according to the specifications? But alas, the
Supreme Court has held that while state officials must obey federal law and
not interfere with its administration, Congress may not compel or otherwise
“commandeer” state officials to legislate according to federal dictates5 or to
enforce federal law.6 Notably, the Constitution allows state court judges to
be compelled to hear federal claims to the extent they hear similar state
claims.7
This Essay argues that the Court’s line between state judges and other
state officials is not as clean as the case law suggests. Specifically, early
state constitutions, as well as the British constitutional order prevailing
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Ronald M. Gould, United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. For helpful comments, I thank Evan Caminker, Jamie Heine, Joan Larsen,
and Jessica Morton.
1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152 (2010) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 20, 21, 25, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b) (2012).
3. Abby Goodnough, Liking It or Not, States Prepare for Health Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 2012, at A1.
4. See King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014).
5. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161–66 (1992).
6. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925–31 (1997).
7. See id. at 928–29; Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389–94 (1947).
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before the U.S. Constitution was enacted—which did not separate powers
as rigidly as the U.S. Constitution—combine to undermine the distinction.
Taking this line of analysis seriously is not to deny that commandeering
state executive or legislative officials raises federalism concerns. But
paying more careful attention to early state conceptions of the separation of
powers furthers federalist goals in another way: it engenders respect for the
states’ freedom to deviate from the model of government the U.S.
Constitution establishes for the federal government. More generally, and
perhaps more importantly, this Essay follows in the tradition of other
scholarship in emphasizing that one should not look only to the U.S.
Constitution to understand the American constitutional tradition: the many
state constitutions throughout American history are a part of that tradition
also.8
I. PRINTZ AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
In Printz v. United States,9 the Supreme Court invalidated provisions of
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that required local law
enforcement officers to run background checks on prospective handgun
buyers within their respective jurisdictions.10 Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia grounded the decision in federalism concerns and reasoned
that such schemes violated the Constitution based on the Court’s
precedents, the Constitution’s structure, quotations from The Federalist,
and the dearth of commandeering schemes in early congressional practice.11
Following an earlier case that had invalidated commandeering of state
legislatures,12 Printz held that the structure of the Constitution permitted
commandeering of only state judges but not other state officials.13 The
Court’s commandeering jurisprudence has attracted considerable scholarly
commentary, much of it critical.14
Though the bulk of the majority opinion (and the dissent) focused on
federalism, one brief section also stated that the commandeering scheme at
issue would violate the separation of powers, insofar as only the President is
empowered to enforce federal law.15 The section consisted of a breezy
invocation of the Take Care Clause, citations to The Federalist, and an
8. See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE
CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 28–30 (2012).
9. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
10. Id. at 933–34.
11. Id. at 905–29.
12. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
13. Printz, 521 U.S. at 928–29.
14. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism,
118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1295–1302 (2009); Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and
the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 199, 201–02; Wesley J. Campbell,
Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1104, 1106–09 (2013); Roderick
M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy
Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 824–30, 855–56
(1998); Gil Seinfeld, The Jurisprudence of Union, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1133–37
(2014).
15. Printz, 521 U.S. at 922–23.
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article about the unitary executive theory.16 This very short segment of the
Printz opinion has been subjected to only occasional scholarly attention.17
But prior scholarship has pointed out some problems with the kind of
separation of powers reasoning deployed by the Printz Court: the
explanation may not adequately account for voluntary state enforcement of
federal law, such as enforcement pursuant to conditional spending regimes,
that have consistently been sustained in the face of constitutional challenge,
and it also fails to persuade that invalidating the offending legislation is the
best remedy.18
But the separation of powers analysis in Printz also inspires a different
approach to the commandeering issue, one that focuses on the separation of
powers (or lack thereof) at the state level.
II. UNSEPARATED POWERS IN EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Early state constitutional arrangements and the eighteenth-century British
constitutional order suggest not only that the line between state judges and
other state officials was not always clear, but also that those who wrote and
ratified the U.S. Constitution contemplated just such a state of affairs.
The Constitution contains no explicit requirement that states separate
their powers. To be sure, the federal government must guarantee to each
state “a Republican Form of Government”19 and states may not deprive
persons of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”20
Though these clauses’ meanings are underdetermined by the constitutional
text—indeed, the contours of the due process requirement are constantly
litigated—one can imagine that wholly unseparated powers might violate
them. If, for example, the same state institution made, enforced, and
interpreted law, and meted out criminal punishment absent independent
review, that arrangement would likely raise serious due process concerns.
But by and large, the Constitution gives states considerable leeway in
organizing their own governments.21
There is no reason to assume that the federal model of separated powers
was understood at the time of ratification to be the one that states would or
should adopt. Until 2009, the U.K. House of Lords functioned as a court of

16. Id.
17. Among the articles that have examined whether the federal separation of powers
forbids commandeering are Jay S. Bybee, Printz, the Unitary Executive, and the Fire in the
Trash Can: Has Justice Scalia Picked the Court’s Pocket?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 269
(2001), and Evan H. Caminker, The Unitary Executive and State Administration of Federal
Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1075 (1997).
18. Caminker, supra note 17, at 1077–78.
19. U.S. CONST. art. IV. But that clause has been held nonjusticiable under the political
question doctrine. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. But judicial review of a state’s separation of powers
for compliance with due process also may be unavailable. See Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S.
71, 84 (1902).
21. A fact that Printz itself recognized. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 908 n.2.
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last resort in addition to the upper chamber of Parliament.22 Specifically,
the role of the king’s governing council in the Middle Ages, which
eventually evolved into Parliament, included a judicial function for
centuries.23 And though the jurisdiction of the House of Lords would
expand and contract over time,24 this was the system that prevailed at the
time the U.S. Constitution was ratified and with which the ratifying
generation would have been familiar.
In colonial America, moreover, many colonies had governmental
institutions that blurred the lines among legislative, executive, and judicial
officers.25 Both Massachusetts and Virginia permitted their governors and
legislative officials to decide judicial cases and make rules.26 Nowhere
were executive officers, legislators, and judges cleanly distinguished from
one another.27
State practices soon after the Constitution was ratified may be similarly
useful to interpreting constitutional meaning. The history of state
constitutional conventions shows a considerable willingness to reject
aspects of the federal model of separated powers.28 Under the New York
constitutions of 1777 and 1821, the state’s highest court “consisted of the
president of the senate, the senators, the chancellor, and the justices of the
supreme court.”29 Similarly, the New Jersey constitution of 1776 provided
that the governor sit on the appellate court of last resort.30 Even when the
U.S. Supreme Court encountered such blended institutions, it passed on
them without comment. Consider Calder v. Bull,31 an old chestnut of 1L
Constitutional Law courses used to demonstrate the divide between natural
law theories and legal positivism; there, the Connecticut state legislature sat
essentially as a court, passing a law to overturn a ruling of a probate court
and ordering a new hearing in the dispute.32 And in 1902, admittedly much
later in American history, the Court was explicit in its recognition of state
authority to separate powers as the state saw fit:
Whether the legislative, executive and judicial powers of a State shall be
kept altogether distinct and separate, or whether persons or collections of
persons belonging to one department may, in respect to some matters,
exert powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to another department of
government, is for the determination of the State. And its determination
one way or the other cannot be an element in the inquiry, whether the due
process of law prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment has been
22. See generally GLENN DYMOND, HOUSE OF LORDS, LIBRARY NOTE: THE APPELLATE
JURISDICTION OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS (2009), available at http://www.parliament.uk/
documents/lords-library/lln2009-010appellate.pdf.
23. Id. at 2.
24. See id. at 2–6.
25. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 7–17 (3d ed. 2005).
26. Id. at 10–11.
27. See id. at 14.
28. JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 3, 97 (2006).
29. FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 91.
30. Id.
31. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
32. Id. at 386–87.
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respected by the State or its representatives when dealing with matters
involving life or liberty.33

Thus, not only can we be confident that unseparated powers are
permissible under the Constitution, but the evidence provided by the
colonial and early Republic experience suggests that such arrangements
were understood to be entirely unremarkable at the time of federal
constitutional ratification.
This conclusion seriously undercuts the
soundness of Printz’s distinction between state judges and other state
officials.
III. IF STATE JUDGES MAY BE COMMANDEERED,
OTHER OFFICIALS OUGHT TO BE SIMILARLY SUSCEPTIBLE
TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMANDEERING
The historical evidence regarding the separation of powers at the state
level suggests that if state judges can be compelled to hear federal claims,
other state officials can be similarly commandeered. The Supremacy
Clause does not distinguish between the different types of officials, and a
functional distinction likely would have been unworkable at the time of the
Founding and remains so today. Bearing these considerations in mind may
help foster respect for federalism, albeit in a different way than the Printz
Court thought was important.
The fuzzy lines separating state judges from other officers undermine the
Printz distinction as a general matter. But the distinction is even weaker
when one considers and rejects some of Printz’s justifications for the
distinction. First, the decision noted that judicial commandeering was
justified not by the Supremacy Clause generally but by the Judges Clause,34
which binds state judges to respect federal law in conflict with state law.35
But as the dissent and a number of scholars demonstrate, that is not a viable
reading of the Judges Clause.36 The clause instead should be read as a
conflict-of-law rule for those cases when state judges hear claims in which
state and federal laws contradict each other, rather than an affirmative grant
of authority to the federal government to demand that state courts hear
federal causes of action.37 This reading makes sense of the clause’s
language pertaining to “contrary” state law.
Moreover, suggesting, as Printz appears to, that one can functionally
distinguish judicial officers from other types of state officers may not be a
33. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902).
34. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
35. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907 (1997).
36. See, e.g., id. at 968 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty
and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1036–38 (1995).
37. See Caminker, supra note 36, at 1036–37; Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver,
Federal Power to Commandeer State Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial
Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71, 80–81 (1998) (arguing that the Judges Clause represents
means of implementing power to commandeer state courts, rather than the source of that
power).
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sound rule, as tensions within the Printz opinion itself demonstrate. Simply
put, when titles and functions are blended as much as they were in some
early state constitutions, and as much as they might be in a hypothetical
future state system, it is hard to distinguish between a court and an
executive body. Printz noted that the federal government defending the
Brady law could find no refuge in a prior case upholding a requirement that
a state administrative agency apply federal law while acting in a judicial
capacity.38 But earlier in the opinion, the Court discussed early acts of
Congress requiring state courts, for example, to transmit citizenship
applications to the Secretary of State and order the deportation of alien
enemies in wartime.39 Those tasks seem fundamentally executive in nature,
but the Court minimized their significance because the statutes only
compelled judges to act, as opposed to other types of officials. That
reasoning implies that functional distinctions are not enough; one must look
to what type of state official is acting. But in our constitutional order,
where states are afforded considerable freedom to structure their own
governments, it may not always be possible to determine when a state
official qualifies as a judge. Moreover, the extent of states’ discretion to
assign nonjudicial functions to judges and judicial functions to other
officers may go well beyond the minor examples discussed in Printz—
examples which may not show a real difference between state systems and
the federal separation of powers.40 The minor executive tasks distinguished
away in Printz are different in kind from the circumstances in Calder and
under early state constitutional provisions naming legislators and executive
officials as members of state courts. There is nothing in the Constitution to
prevent states from adopting similar structures in the future, and a rule that
Congress may commandeer judges but not others is unlikely to be workable
if any do.
Ultimately, the source of authority for judicial commandeering makes no
difference to this analysis. For example, whether the power to compel state
courts to hear federal claims is derived from Congress’s Article I powers41
or from some structural constitutional principle of union,42 the distinction
between judges and other officials as a matter of state constitutional
structure is untenable and creates serious doubt about the viability of the
Printz distinction.
It is worth noting briefly that undercutting the distinction between
judicial officers and other state officials also could suggest an alternative
conclusion: that the commandeering of any state officials, including
38. Printz, 521 U.S. at 929 (majority opinion) (distinguishing FERC v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742 (1982), on the grounds that it upheld a federal statute that only established
preconditions for continued state regulation).
39. Id. at 905–06.
40. For instance, by statute, the Chief Justice of the United States serves on the Board of
Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, a job that also seems executive rather than judicial in
nature. See 20 U.S.C. § 42 (2012). But I have seen no suggestion that assigning this task to a
judicial officer offends the federal separation of powers.
41. See Redish & Sklaver, supra note 37, at 88–90.
42. See Seinfeld, supra note 14, at 1133–37.
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judges, is contrary to the Constitution’s federalist structure. But that
conclusion seems untenable in light of the long history of state judges being
expected to hear federal claims on an equal footing with state claims. To
overrule Testa v. Katt43 would upset the applecart in a way that rethinking
the commandeering decisions would not. First, New York, Printz, and the
older commandeering cases on which they relied are more recent. Second,
as Printz points out as one basis for its holding, it is difficult to find many,
if any, other examples of Congress attempting the sort of commandeering
schemes invalidated in those cases.
Thus, the damage to settled
expectations resulting from a reassessment of the commandeering cases
would be much less than from freeing state courts to reject federal claims
for any reason they choose.
CONCLUSION
This Essay provides one more reason to be skeptical of the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in the commandeering cases. Printz’s separation of
powers discussion is unsatisfying to say the least. But the case’s holding is
rooted in federalism. Others have critiqued the historical foundations of—
and the policy objections to—that rationale. That is well beyond the scope
of this Essay. Rather, I hope that my argument suggests the possibility that
recognizing a controversial federal commandeering power would not
necessarily be an affront to federalism. Instead of superimposing
assumptions about the federal separation of powers onto the states,
respecting the alternative structural constitutional arrangements that states
may choose might actually enhance federalist goals.

43. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).

